


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Review forum

Reading Matthew G. Hannah's *Dark Territory in the Information Age: Learning from the West German Census Controversies of the 1980s*

Dark Territory in the Information Age: Learning from the West German Census Controversies of the 1980s, Matthew G. Hannah. Ashgate, Farnham and Burlington, VT (2010). 257, ISBN: 9781409408130

Introduction

This review forum is the result of a discussion panel at the Seattle Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers in April 2011, at which Matt Hannah's book was also awarded the 2011 Julian Minghi Outstanding Research Award from the Political Geography Specialty Group of the AAG. The diversity of both the panel's audience and the respondents (Jeremy Crampton, Patricia Ehrkamp and Neil Smith) represented the remarkable richness of *Dark Territory in the Information Age*, which merited the further discussion included in these papers. To this end, further commentary was solicited after the meeting from Bernd Belina, one of the foremost radical geographers working in contemporary Germany.

In *Dark Territory*, Matt Hannah builds upon his established reputation in census-studies, the politics of governmentality, and territory formation (notably Hannah, 2000). In the decade between his two research monographs he has expanded the scope of his research to deliberate spaces of (un)exception, leftist politics, and cold war Germany. All of these interests have come together in this remarkable book, which examines the census boycott movement in 1980s West Germany. Within this decade there were two censuses: one that happened, and one that did not. The 1982–1983 protest movement formed the background for the Federal Constitutional Court's decision to halt the census leading to its suspension; the 1987 census, in contrast, took place in the face of battles in the streets, stairwells and courtrooms. Hannah uses these contestations to examine a series of moments that are highly specific, but which provide us with a window to look into a pivotal late-Cold War moment in both the development of the West German state and of the social movements that opposed it.

Explicit "theoretical" discussions are noticeable by their absence in *Dark Territories*, although the theories that were being discussed at the time are used to great effect. There is, however, a recurring analytical opposition that weaves its way throughout the book. It frames the material for the presentist discussion in the conclusion, which addresses the challenges that contemporary capitalism poses us regarding data collection and use. This opposition is that between *epistemic sovereignty* and *informational citizenship*. The former refers to the rights to information that authorities can proclaim. In this case, Hannah examined the state's right to information about life

in private space, a right often based upon explicitly biopolitical claims (i.e., that without these statistics the population cannot be sufficiently provisioned for). However, this sovereignty came up against various limits that eschew any easy correlations of the state with power, and resistance with the citizen. The domestic proved to be epistemologically resistant, forcing the state to rely upon citizens to self-report on this domain. Yet from efforts to resist this subjectification Hannah extracts the outlines of an informational citizenship which we can continue to learn from today, regarding informational self-determination, standards for data collectors, data representatives, and dialog with social movements. This speaks to those of us trying to fathom the intricate links between sovereign- and bio- powers, and to those exploring the subjective and collective forms of resistance to micro-capitalism and mass-data storage.

These more analytical points are threaded through the brilliantly detailed exploration of the failed first attempt at a census, and the eventual pushing through of data collection in 1987. Continually resisting the urge to reify or de-personalize the state, Hannah brings to light dissenting officials, the development of data protection rules, and debates about constitutional rights and the trust-worthiness of the state that the anti-census movement provoked. This resistance was to the idea of the surveillance state, but also to the lack of transparency over what happened to the data when it was collected, who processed it, and how it could be manipulated. Attempts to violently and silently repress the movement called into being the repressive state which those on the left had always feared. The eventual census was met both with a "hard boycott" (no-returns, at about 1–2 percent) as well as an ingenious range of techniques for returning the form, but not in stipulated manner, all in the context of ongoing court challenges. The responses below will raise new perspectives on *Dark Territories*, and hopefully serve as bridgeheads to the new and diverse readerships which this outstanding work deserves.

Stephen Legg
University of Nottingham

The spaces and complexities of citizenship

In *Dark Territory in the Information Age*, Matt Hannah examines the question and possibility of informational citizenship through controversies about government attempts in 1983 and 1987 to administer a comprehensive census in West Germany. Through the lens of the census controversies, Matt Hannah constructs a historical geography that captures much of the spirit of Germany in the 1980s. In that, the *Dark Territories* is much broader and richer than its title and subtitle would suggest. The introduction alone is a tour de force that carefully situates the ideals, ideologies, myths, and contestations of political culture in Germany in the specific historic moment that followed the student and protest movements

of the 1960s, the trauma inflicted by the violent actions and the state's persecution of the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF) during the 1970s and 1980s, the formation of extra-parliamentary social movements and opposition, and the origins of the Green Party.

Hannah's analysis moves back and forth between the motivations and rationales of extra-parliamentary opposition movements and state agencies, thereby clearly highlighting the contradictions inherent in the West German state in the 1980s in its multiple institutions, facets, and expressions. Another major contribution *Dark Territories* makes is its analysis of the deep entanglements of West German politics with the political interests and fears of the GDR. The analysis draws on rich archival materials that range from print media, including such university and local newspapers as the city of Bonn's *De Schnüss* (Bonn served as Germany's capital until 1993), to government documents and legal opinions, decisions of the constitutional court, and flyers and materials produced by boycott initiatives. The latter, in particular, have not been accessible to readers in English. Working through these archival data, Hannah's deep and multi-faceted analysis brings to life the uneven spaces of politics, policy-making, and policy contestation of Germany in the 1980s.

It is perhaps no surprise then, that reading *Dark Territory* brought back memories of living in Germany for me. In 1987, a friend from school, wearing what seemed like a superfluous ID tag – since we knew him quite well – stopped by to count my parents' household. He sat down with my mother to fill in a detailed questionnaire that asked, among other things, for information about household income, the family, the size of the home, etc. It seemed strange even then that my friend from school would be sent by the state to learn about our family and to talk about aspects of the household that otherwise seemed private. I recount this brief episode because it illustrates just one of the many reasons why census critics were challenging the government: its assurances about data confidentiality and anonymity were questionable, even at the moment of data collection. By law, enumerators were not to enumerate their own neighborhoods; and yet that is what they did. Related questions about the ownership, storage, and future use of information were concerns that not only occupied census critics and state-appointed data protection officials, but are also at the center of the concept of informational citizenship that Hannah outlines in the conclusion of *Dark Territory*.

An intriguing aspect of the census controversies is the central role that the private and intimate spheres – and the material private spaces of homes – played as both the object and site of political contestation. Because the intimate sphere is constitutionally protected as inviolable, the state could not enter private spaces – the material representation of the intimate sphere. Private spaces, accordingly, limited the federal government's 'epistemic sovereignty,' which in turn rendered private spaces public and political despite the clear legal separation of private from public space. Such complexities, of course, are at the center of feminist scholarship that has pointed out that private space is too often overlooked as the site of politics and citizenship (Lister, 1997; Staeheli, 1996). In Germany's census controversies, the physical space of the home emerged as a contradictory space of citizenship. Homes were the sites of challenges to the reach of the state's epistemic sovereignty, as Hannah's discussion of *Wohngemeinschaften* (WGs) in Berlin and Hamburg, in particular, made clear (p. 69). If WGs that arose from Germany's squatter movement in the 1970s and 1980s became the sites of active, informational citizenship as centers for political mobilizing, other types of households were also involved in the census controversies, albeit in different ways. Private homes became the sites of compliance with requests for information as millions of census forms were filled in, but households other than WGs receive less attention in *Dark Territories*. Such households

do, however, pose interesting questions with regard to the subjects of citizenship. Whereas WGs generally consisted of adults (at least before the law), those households where heads of household filled in census forms frequently comprised families consisting of adults and children. Children – defined as those who had not reached the age of maturity at the time of enumeration – were unable to make their own decisions about boycotting the census because they were, by definition, part of a household or family entity, and not yet citizens. Spaces of the home then merit further examination of the different subjects, dynamics, and constraints of citizenship.

Relatedly, competing understandings of (liberal democratic) citizenship emerge throughout *Dark Territories*. Because the state could not simply enter the constitutionally protected private space of individual homes, data collection relied on citizens' participation. It is in the context of this conundrum, in which the state seeks to extract personal information from citizens but also has to depend on its citizens to (truthfully) reveal such information, that the census boycotts in the 1980s open the potential for different expressions of citizenship: the possibilities for refusal, for criticism, and for compliance. Germany's federal government, in the aftermath of anti-terror measures against the RAF, in many ways functioned according to what Young (2003: 1) in her analysis of post-9/11 US politics calls "the logic of masculinist protection." This logic of masculinist protection requires "cooperative obedience" (Young, 2003: 9) as an enactment of good citizenship and places those who are to be protected in a subordinate relationship with their elected representatives and the state. Such notions of subordination become perhaps clearest in the *Verfassungsgericht's* characterization of opposition to the census as being borne out of citizens' ignorance. In the context of Germany's census, good citizenship would have entailed placing trust in elected representatives, filling in census forms, and returning these forms without questioning the necessity of a census. But, of course, there are other expressions of citizenship that emphasize the democratic aspects of dissent, disobedience, and critical engagement with the state. Informational citizenship, as Hannah outlines it, stresses the importance of *active* citizenship, i.e., the ability of citizens to take ownership and retain control of their information. Boycott initiatives and challenges from within 'the state' by municipalities and by data protection officials enacted this understanding of citizenship. Anti-census activists devised numerous strategies of boycotting the census which come to life in Hannah's analysis. Providing inaccurate information, suffocating the governments' information system with more information than was asked for – and in narrative prose – spilling coffee over census forms, or otherwise making information illegible were among the 'soft' boycott strategies that sought to evade penalty. But informational citizenship most clearly, if we follow Hannah's argument, emerges in the creation of a new, alternative model of participation in data collection through 'hard' boycott strategies (p. 135). Here, activists anonymized census forms by clipping off identifiers and collecting these anonymized forms to drop off with state agencies, demonstrating that other ways of gathering and using information were possible.

So, what then are the implications of the 1980s census controversies for the 2011 *Zensus* (census) and informational citizenship? One consequence of the boycott movements is that it took the German government 24 years to undertake another comprehensive enumeration. The 2011 *Zensus* uses a so-called combination method. It counts only one third of the population and has fewer questions than the 1987 census. In addition, the 2011 census draws on a representative 10 percent sample (micro census) and gathers additional information by consolidating and cross-checking existing databases such as unemployment registers, housing databases and the *Melderegister* (residence register), which is what the constitutional court explicitly prohibited in 1983. Personal identifiers will be stored for some four years and allow state officials to trace

information back to individuals, a step toward enabling profiling. And, as in the 1980s, the census was contested in 2011 by both state and non-state entities. For example, the SPD-governed state of Hesse and some municipalities threatened to boycott the census because Germany's federal government did not commit to reimbursing expenses. In addition, municipalities and states felt forced to collect data that they did not necessarily deem useful (Anon., 2010). Notably, some of the grassroots resistance was organized using new information technologies and social media such as Google groups. A public event site on Facebook with 3525 attendees called for boycotting the 2011 census. Facebook, in particular, is notorious about not protecting the privacy of its users. Given that track record, the notion of mobilizing via Facebook in the name of protecting privacy seems contradictory, and raises interesting questions with regard to informational citizenship and the new possibilities and limits that social media generate for oppositional geographies.

If in 1987 the government had to rely on citizens to actively provide information, this relationship shifted considerably in 2011 toward more power for state entities and less possibility for active citizenship because citizens' involvement in data collection became much more limited in 2011 than in the 1980s. This scenario was predicted in 1983 by Günter Appel, then head of West Berlin's statistical bureau, to be more dangerous to self-determination than a comprehensive census (p. 81). For those interested in collecting data, as Marco Carini (2010) noted "the combined procedure offers a powerful advantage: databases don't boycott, don't give false information to register protest, and aren't known to be particularly keen on lawsuits." Clearly, the government of now unified Germany, too, learned from the census controversies.

Patricia Ehrkamp
University of Kentucky

Informational citizenship, the "geobiopolitical" subject and the state

Matt Hannah's latest book is a rich, dense and significant work, with provocations that fly off nearly every page. As he flags in the subtitle "Learning from the West German Census Controversies in the 1980s" *Dark Territories* is situated in the specific census boycott initiatives (*VoBo Ini*) of (West) Germany nearly 30 years ago, but ultimately takes as its target a far larger question. That is, to what extent and under what conditions is it possible to exercise "information self-determination"? This is not solely a technological or even technocratic issue, but as he clearly shows, one of spatial politics.

Contemporary parallels to *Dark Territories*

A number of contemporary parallels and questions highlight the significance of the *Dark Territories*' subtitle. What can we learn from the census boycotts regarding the possibilities for informational citizenship in the information age?

1. In March 2011, Green Party member Malte Spitz undertook an incredible self-experiment to record his private geolocational information (PGI) over a six-month period. When his phone automatically checked his email every ten minutes, his PGI was recorded. Using this data and other open source information, with Spitz' permission, *Zeit Online* created one of the most "intimate" interactive maps ever constructed of a life, consisting of over 35,000 latitude-longitude coordinates over six months (*Zeit Online*, 2011). It is more than enough to create a profile of his activities, his preferences, his sleeping locations and even how fast and by what means he traveled. In light of

this, readers of Hannah's book will not be surprised to learn that Germany is currently reconsidering its data retention laws once again.

2. On the other hand, two bills introduced before the US Congress in 2011 (HR 611 and HR 654) attempt to restrict government and corporate access to PGI. This term, which remains largely undefined and untested in American courts, is directly related to the German census boycott ruling of 1983. In that ruling, the judges found that the Census could reach into the private sphere but not into the constitutionally inviolate "intimate" sphere. It ruled that the government could and should know about your living space, but it could not enter them directly or "linger" there. Thus we might say that the two US bills and the 1983 decision affirm a third component in the public-private relationship; the intimate space or PGI. Thus, public-private-intimate. Hannah's book invites this question: is it the case that incursions into the private sphere by the state and other surveillant institutions have been more or less achieved, and that it is only in the "intimate" realm that any personal privacy remains?

Arguments for a census

Although it is not necessary to reduce debate on Hannah's book to a specific position on whether or not a census should be carried out by the state, and in fact I think for good reason he refuses this choice in favor of a politics of informational citizenship, it is worth exploring credible positive reasons for a census. This is underplayed (although not ignored) in the *Dark Territories*. This issue hangs on the viability of "intimate" data gathering practice by state-corporate entities. How does the census constitute what we might call "geobiopolitical" subjects (Minca, 2006)? As a census data user, in reading this book I was continually invited to reflect on what it means for social scientists and geographers to rely on the census for our work.

As Hannah notes (p. 80–82) those in Germany defending the census appealed to several lines of argument, but the one he himself suggests is the strongest is that census data can be used for planning (e.g. of schools) and for allocating funds to local governments for social programs. Interestingly, as he also notes this latter position appropriated some of the language of the anti-census movement in arguing that basic human rights are at stake. If for the *VoBo Ini* rights were infringed by an intrusive state, the census statisticians warned that underfunding social programs would infringe rights just as much if not more if social deprivation was undercounted. Of course, this is a typical rationality of government as discussed in Hannah's (2000) *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America*.

It is worth looking at the politics of how these data are used. The most direct use of the decennial census data in the USA are the two-fold apportionment and redistricting processes. Where the former allocates or apportions the 435 Congressional Representatives to states according to their share of the total population (a process that had been completed when this review was prepared in mid-2011), redistricting redraws the Congressional Districts themselves. Redistricting will occur over the course of 2011 and 2012 in most states (exceptions include states with only one district and Washington, DC). Both of these are contested and charged political processes. In 2000, Utah sued to have its overseas missionaries counted which would have garnered it an additional district (and an electoral college vote in presidential elections, since a state's number of electoral votes is derived from its number of Congressional Representatives).

For these two purposes it seems clear to me that it is necessary to have a reliable census. If it is part of the democratic ideal that (within a state) the Congressional Representatives represent about equal numbers of people (a principle also found in other countries

such as the UK) it is necessary to know within the state, where those people are. Whether this basic information is garnered through a decennial census, the American Community Survey (a more frequent data collection effort by the US Census Bureau) or other sampling would all be equally viable in my opinion.

Hannah's book concludes with thirty pages of thoughtful reflection on the possibilities of "active citizenship" in the information age. His point is not to reject information technology, but to explore how much control people may be able to assert in the way that it operates. This question productively connects to similar enquiries in participatory GIS, "citizen science" and volunteered geographic information (VGI).

For example, how can something like census-based redistricting be done in a more participatory manner? Typically redistricting is the provenance of state legislatures who were elected in the previous year. (The Census Bureau is under obligation to provide states with redistricting data within one year of the enumeration.) But there are several instances at this time of potentially more participatory efforts. Are there ways in which census data can be made more accessible for citizen politics? Florida for example has developed an innovative app called MyDistrictBuilder with which it plans to involve the public in submitting redistricting maps for Florida districts (state and Congressional). Yet this is a difficult process involving both voter education and community buy-in. Politics as usual may trump these nascent beginnings. Given that the reported redistricting cost of another state (Georgia) will be \$3.8 m this nevertheless represents a remarkable capacity in the hands of the public who might be aware of it.

In sum, there are a number of compelling arguments in favor of some sort of enumeration. In an era of increasing voter apathy and political disengagement, if these census-based tools can increase transparency in the political process and citizen engagement, then this is a good thing. Indeed, Hannah's conclusion lays out possibilities where statistical knowledges "*returned to the hands of the governed themselves, [and] a more authoritative and better grounded counter-knowledge*" (p. 223, emphasis added). Census-based data coupled with the sort of new spatial media that allow citizen-drawn redistricting maps is an example of this counter-mapping.

Constituting the geobiopolitical subject

A challenge Hannah poses through his notion of epistemic sovereignty is in what ways the state is constituting subjects. This is the heart of *Dark Territories*. If the first question is "Should there be a census (or sampling)?" and we grant that there should be, then the second question is, "What data should it collect?" The *Dark Territories* cover, which Hannah comes back to for his title of "dark territory" of the residential collectives, represents "the futility of attempting to capture the richness of...human life" (p. 68). If a "bare life" pure head-count or enumeration doesn't do this then it could be argued we need *more* data, not less! But of course *Dark Territory's* concern is not how much data is collected, but who controls it. Here we confront Hannah's issue of whether (any) census is problematic only due to misuse or "already in the everyday use, of statistics" (p. 44). In the information age it seems better to ask how this everyday use of statistics constitutes subjects, rather than whether people can escape being statistically represented. This goes especially for "geostatistical" representations, or geosurveillance, as the Malte Spitz case cited above makes clear.

A few points about the nature of census data seem worth making in this context. Where the census goes beyond this "bare life" (pure head-count) it seems likely to invoke biopolitical categories, e.g. the category of "fast reproducing foreigners" (p. 47) cited in one analysis in the VoBo newspaper "taz." Here the purpose is to

segment the population through "dividing practices" into normal/deviant or "the criminals and the good boys" as Foucault once put it (1983, 208). As Hannah points out "epistemic sovereignty is always inherently spatial" (p. 111) and the map is a vital technology of governmental rationality.

In his Conclusions, Hannah engages with the "profound challenge" of this sovereignty. He offers a series of questions meant to provoke reflection. These involve the possibilities of individual resistances and refusals to information requests (but would these be co-opted?), of data producer collectives (DPCs); although why would citizens trust these more than government data collection? There are possibilities of legal and legislative change (though as he admits he glosses over the "huge field" of more transparent government and oversight, p. 221), of opt-ins instead of opt-outs (a feature of one of the aforementioned Congressional bills). Hannah concludes, and I think I would agree, that the possibilities for individual-level resistance remain marginal and that a collective (or, in today's language, social-network-based) response holds more possibilities. He argues that an "alternative form of information" may become possible; thus the idea is not to do without the information, but to challenge the state's sovereignty over its collection, storage and distribution. In the term "informational citizenship" lies not just a question of knowledge, but of power.

Jeremy W. Crampton
University of Kentucky

Travelling theory

I would like to use this brief commentary to share some thoughts on "travelling theory" (Said, 1983) or, as it were, on theory that stayed home and was visited by younger soulmates from abroad. More precisely, I want to think about the relationship between the use of a travelling 'Foucault' as a "discursive construction" (Hannah, 2007: 83) in recent scholarship in (not only) German language geography, criminology and political science on the one hand and West German debates about "security" from the 1970s and 1980s on the other hand. This discussion, inspired by the contemporary rapprochement of Foucauldian and Marxist positions in radical German discourse, is a bit of a detour to engage in the question: in what sense is *Dark Territory* Foucauldian?

When I started, as a student in the late 1990s, to do research on urban policing, I discovered a rich body of critical and radical literature from and on the 1970s and 1980s in West Germany that focused particularly on how and why the reach of the repressive apparatuses of the state, using criminal law and anti-terrorism measures, was continuously widened and extended. Processes in law, politics, and public discourse gave state apparatuses a repressive grasp on individuals and groups by, for example, criminalizing "membership in a terrorist organization" (§129a Criminal Law, included 1976), checking the political attitude of trainee teachers, university faculty or civil servants (from 1972 onwards, often resulting in banning people from these jobs) or using the famous *Rasterfahndung* (translated by Hannah as "roughly 'grid-search' or 'data dragnet'"; 15) in the search for terrorists. This technique, invented and first applied by the then chief of the federal police Horst Herold in the 1970s, uses data from all available sources in order to search for, for example, people who rented an apartment in Frankfurt am Main and paid their electricity bill in cash, or people between 25 and 30 years of age that use the night train from Cologne to Paris. As is obvious from the examples, the presumption of innocence is suspended here, legitimized by claims of "security". For Herold, the main duty of the federal police was to "search in a researcher's fashion the vast amount of available facts for all kinds of weird and deviant behavior" (Cobler, 1980: 36) with "the computer as an instrument of societal diagnosis" (Cobler, 1980 : 40).

While reading *Dark Territory*, a couple of things about this older literature from political science, criminology and legal studies struck me, especially when compared with the more recent use of 'Foucault'. First, this literature does not make much of the specificity of this West German approach to "security" that Foucault was well aware of (cf. Hannah, 2012). Arguably, nowhere else in the West were "security measures" as prevalent as in West Germany (see the concise account in *Dark Territory*: 5–29).

Second, while identifying a specific logic at work that is usually characterized as "preventive" or "security", this logic is usually discussed in the context of the rule of law or the legal form (the juridical logic in Foucault's terms) in which it effectively takes place in the capitalist state – and not as a logic opposed to and gaining importance relative to the "juridical logic", as much Foucault-inspired writing would have it, following Foucault's remarks on the three distinct logics of power at the beginning of the governmentality lectures.

Third, in this older literature, although Foucault is never mentioned and governmentality studies and the securitization debate were unheard of, discussions of the security state and its preventive logic, the role of data gathering and risk calculation or the ideological achievement of de-politicizing social phenomena by treating them as risk take place in empirical detail and theoretical depth. The legal scholar Sebastian Cobler, for example, wrote in 1976 (p.38): "For the complete registration of all potential 'breaches of the order' (...) early-warning and surveillance systems were developed by the police that all citizens – not just 'enemies of the state' – are exposed to in an either specific or indiscriminate-preventive manner." This literature, it seems to me, asks exactly the same questions and comes to very similar answers as much Foucault-inspired work from the 1990s onwards.

Fourth, these West German answers often included an honest attempt to discuss security and risk in relation to the economic, political and general social processes within which they gain currency, the best example being Joachim Hirsch's *Der Sicherheitsstaat* (1980) in which the author, a Marxist theoretician of the state, offers an explanation of the "orgy of security" (11) of the late 1970s by showing how and why the crisis of Fordist social relations with its specific German modus of mass integration fostered the "dominance of the security apparatuses" (p. 111–123). This moving beyond the questions of *how* security and risk are deployed in order to wrestle with the questions as to *why* this kind of governing the population is applied necessitates social theory and a knowledge of the developments of power relations.

As space does not allow for a discussion of the 'Foucault' mentioned earlier that traveled to (not only) German language scholarship in geography, criminology and political science, often in the context of Anglo-American governmentality studies or the securitization debate, this 'Foucault' is only portrayed very insufficiently here – pretty much as a straw doll I'm afraid. For my point, suffice it to say that, while often shedding critical light on concrete developments in security discourses and practices, the alleged newness and anti-Marxism (AKA 'post-structuralism') of this theoretical stance is what I am not at all happy with. Contrary to this, I side with the increasing number of voices who understand Foucault's take on "security" as an important contribution to a critical understanding of the state in the tradition of theorists such as Gramsci or Poulantzas that is far closer to the Marxist tradition than usually admitted. And here *Dark Territory* comes back into the picture, or at least my reading of it.

While Hannah deliberately resists a "wading out into the deeper waters of theoretical debate" (p. 221), *Dark Territories* is rooted in and a major contribution toward a deep understanding of Foucault's work, method and critical stance. One thing I particularly liked about it is the way in which Hannah fruitfully uses a Foucauldian

perspective while sparing the reader yet another summary of the arguments on security, biopower, risk etc. as brought forward by Foucault, in governmentality studies or the securitization literature. These summaries, in my reading experience, more often than not de-politicize the Foucault I have read and tend to turn him into some sort of anti-Marxist theoretician who exclusively focuses on discourse and micropolitics which are portrayed as bearing no relationship to social processes, relations and institutions. My favorite Foucault-quote in this respect: "In reality, it would not make any sense at all to claim that just discourse existed. A simple example: Capitalist exploitation was put into practice without ever really having been phrased in a discourse." (Foucault, 2002a: 783).

What Hannah does instead, following Foucault, is to have a close look at what was actually going on and at concrete practices and discourses as they are rooted in and emanate from social praxis. He does that by providing, for example, context and meaning to the census boycott movements by placing them within the somewhat strange state of West Germany of the 1980s, or by discussing the way in which boycotters were faced with a state power that was not up for negotiations. While taking his point of departure from what he found in the many archives he dug his way through, Hannah does not settle for presenting discourses and micropolitics but links them to social processes and political struggles that were going on in the 1980s. Just as Foucault does not need to reference Marx to build on his work (Foucault, 2002b), Hannah does not need any lengthy discussion of Foucault or Marx to make clear that his study explores the details of a social movement in order to challenge the way in which we are governed in capitalist society. Thus, *Dark Territories* is an excellent example of *de facto* working with Foucault without using 'Foucault' to signal some sort of theoretical uniqueness or the end of grand theory – which usually results in an abstraction from the social due to an exclusive focus on discourse and micropolitics. As such *Dark Territory* fulfills in praxis what some of the best theoretical discussion of Foucault and Marx have emphasized of late: that while many Marxists could profit from having a closer, Foucauldian look at the concrete, practical way in which the social is produced and reproduced in mundane practices and speech acts (the 'how'), many Foucauldians (or, for that matter, 'post-structuralists') could gain a lot from not forgetting about the "laws of nature" governing society, as Marx ironically called them (the 'why').

Discussed against the two bodies of literature mentioned in this commentary, *Dark Territory* holds an interesting position. While representing a re-socialization and re-politicization of 'Foucault' when read against the backdrop of much recent literature on security, risk and the governing of populations, in comparison to the West German literature mentioned earlier, one could criticize the rather subtle attempts to link the story back to broader social processes. Within its context, with 'Foucault' being the somewhat natural point of reference for discussions of security, risk and the governing of populations, I applaud *Dark Territory* for being an excellent and rather radical study. Read from the perspective of someone to whom 'Foucault' is a more recent visitor travelling in from Anglo-American discussions in geography, criminology or international relations, and who will always be read against the backdrop of Cobler, Hirsch and many others from the West German debates, *Dark Territory* provides a plethora of empirical insights but could use a little more linking back to broader social processes every here and there.

Bernd Belina
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The Dark Territory of census opposition

Local and national censuses, since their generalization in the modern bourgeois age, have, like their many precursors, drawn

suspicion and opposition from those who, for whatever reason, didn't want to be counted, didn't want their lives and identities quartered, sliced and diced into the categories, ledgers and databases of the state. Whether to avoid economic taxation, moral opprobrium, political surveillance, cultural exile or worse, such recalcitrants understood that census-taking was not just an intrusion on liberal individual freedoms but was always laced through with the intent of population control, property possession and dispossession, social engineering. It is surprising that so few open (as opposed to passive) challenges to census-taking have actually blossomed at the national scale; the Netherlands, where concerted and successful opposition effectively killed the national census after 1971, is a clear exception. Matt Hannah's excellent book documents and analyses one of the most high profile and politicized anti-census movement since then, namely West Germany in the 1980s, and in response he proposes the notion of "informational citizenship."

In April 1983, after a coordinated political and legal mobilization, the national boycott movement succeeded in halting the planned West German census. In so doing the movement maintained what Hannah calls some "dark territory" beyond "the searching gaze of state agencies." For reasons going back to its post-WWII military occupation (still ongoing) and its socio-military reconstruction in the post-fascist Cold War era, the West German state was always been more heavily securitized than its neighbors in western Europe. In this context, the Frankfurt School of Marcuse, Habermas and others produced the "critique of instrumental reason," and in the 1970s the full force of state repression was leveled against the Red Army Faction and related movements. A more thorough swath of broadly repressive civil measures was also instigated and the census boycott was aimed at this instrumentalism. With its census accounting frustrated in 1983, the securitized state regrouped for another attempted census count in 1987 only to be met by a "hard boycott" strategy which eventually enjoyed less success.

The specter of Michel Foucault hangs over Hannah's interrogation of the German census boycott movement but it does so with a light touch. This is primarily a historical and empirical account and properly so, but it frames the question of the census within a broad framework of social calculation, demographic technologies and rationalities, state discipline, and (more ambivalently) the ever-illusive question of "biopower." It is easy to be scandalized by the disciplinary instrumentalism, real or potential, stalking not just the census but the extensive corporate vacuuming of data on individual lives, but Hannah avoids such an easy resort, looking beyond mere scandalizing. He lets the embedded history speak largely for itself, knowing of course that history never speaks for itself yet adeptly choosing the right people and movements to voice that history.

The lightness of the Foucauldian touch is obligatory for two reasons. First, any broader explanation of why the census boycott movement gained such traction in 1980s West Germany would have to blend the specifics of German state formation and responses to it with a broader theoretical critique of the origins and workings of the capitalist state. The question why states (especially national states) repress their citizens – how they do so, whether state repression is universal, why and how state repression and control vary across time and space – these questions are far from self-evident; nor are they separate from the technologies of discipline and punishment, surveillance and the enforcement of order. The focus on "governmentality" has the advantage of escaping an easy fetishism of the state, which Foucault surely identified with the official communist parties of the period, and the advantage too of engaging the governed with the governors in the same social equation. Yet the consequent shift of focus to the

technologies of power and "state effects," the rewriting of the state as a "mythicized abstraction," and the consequent burial of class agency, sacrifices an understanding of the origins, development and motive force of the state and state power, displacing the state as a comparatively unimportant, even misguided, target of political opposition. Not a promising basis for comprehending an anti-census movement.

Second, unless we are happy with the idea that the state is repressive simply for purposes of the self perpetuation of its own power against supposed "enemies of the state," it is necessary also to ask not just the means of power (the governmentality question) but its ends: in whose social interests does the state exercise power? In whose interests and to what ends does or might the (West) German state deploy census data? Foucault's singular contribution is a focus on the political technics of the state, but the abstention from an explicit analysis of the state's social embeddedness limits his utility on these questions. Given the sharp class contours of national state responses to the post-2007 global economic crisis – austerity for the masses, tax breaks and bonuses for corporations, banks and the rich – Marx and Engels' quip that the state resembles an executive committee of the bourgeoisie begins to look less like a conspiracy theory and more like empirical common sense.

Although there is considerable emphasis in *Dark Territory* on the nexus between state and corporate data collection and deployment, Hannah does not engage with class or other social divisions as a means of social change. Somewhat in contrast to other kinds of social difference, class remains its own kind of "dark territory," largely invisible in this account. Rather, the emphasis on "informational citizenship" inquires how citizen control can be enhanced over the forms, sources, presentation and protection of personal data, as well as the identities chosen for enumeration and the conditions of inclusion and exclusion. Paramount is the attempt to devise "arrangements that would more seriously democratize information society," including "data producer collectives" in civil society. *Dark Territories* is energized by a sense that the German census controversies are emblematic of what may be to come, and it is difficult to disagree. As the repressive securitization exercised by states and intrusive corporate data mining intensifies, struggles over census-taking are likely to sharpen, but the picture is far from simple. In 2010 for example, a political skirmish broke out over the Canadian census, but in this case it was not the political left that sought to curtail Big Brother instrumentalism but rather the governing right wing conservatives that successfully abolished all but a perfunctory counting of Canadians. How are we to explain such a right wing assault on the census, and what does this tell us about the future politics of census-taking?

The defining question is this: surveillance for what? The apparent confluence of rightist reaction, *internal to a state they control*, with radical left wing anti-census militance has everything to do with the interests and purposes served by the state, especially as regards class. Far from a pluralist institution responding more or less equally to pressure from all quarters, every state works disproportionately in the interests of a society's rulers and the capitalist state is no exception. In addition to investment in the capitalist economy, a reproduction of ideology, and a claimed monopoly over legitimate violence, the state promises social control and societal security, and this involves carrots and sticks in different proportions. With the advent of the neoliberal state, the enhanced securitization of societies and of economic investment subsidies to capital are matched by the dismantling of mass social services associated with the prior era of Keynesian capitalism, and the functionality of the census has to be seen in this light. In distinction to West Germany in the 1980s, therefore, where the left vilified the security-enhancing surveillance functions of the census, in Canada in 2010 the right wing neoliberal government, intent on

dismantling a welfare state that remained significantly in place, moved against a census-taking exercise which provided ample data on poverty, social wellbeing and other indicators laying bare the need for social services. The class inflection is apparent in this poststructuralism of the right: eliminate the data to change the discourse, and thereby change the world.

This shines a sharp light on Hannah's call for "informational citizenship," a strategy that is sufficiently broad to accommodate the multiple functions and inflections of census-taking and data collection across different contexts. On the optimistic side, the weakness of nation states in the neoliberal moment, dead but dominant as it may be, is partial and selective, but it nonetheless provides an opening for data democracy as part of a larger anti-capitalist movement. But a fuller recognition of the constitutive and equally multi-form role of the state is necessary if we are to take this proposal further. Given the embeddedness of the census in questions of state power, class relations and social control, how is such informational citizenship to be established? Hannah suggests that even modest efforts at data democracy might have "tectonic" effects (p. 222), but the equation may be weighted in the opposite direction. If ubiquitous calls now for a revamped "citizenship" are not to become the spare wheel of a left-leaning cosmopolitanism, they will have to go further in identifying those social agents capable of a new democratic citizenship. Capitalism in the end is inconsistent with a non-surveillance society.

Given the centrality of digital and electronic communication – the internet orchestrator of Wikileaks, Julian Assange, has called Facebook the "most appalling spy machine that has ever been invented" – it is far from clear whether national censuses will remain such a vital software in the capitalist "spy machine." The national census as we know it could become an anachronism in fact, and the supersession of the census could well displace rather than solve the surveillance problem, making it still more appalling. The search for informational democracy points toward the abolition of capitalism per se, but this impeccable logic too can effect its own political displacement: "Take the state first, boys, and we'll worry about data later," would be an unfortunate (and self defeating) slogan to draw from all this. Been there, done that. Rather, while any serious movement for informational citizenship would necessarily be twinned with larger and broader movements that have capitalism and the capitalist state squarely in their sights, the genuine socialization of information needs to be an integral part of a more replete socialization. Here as always, the mutability and ingenuity of capitalist social relations and the ability of capitalism to feast on its best critics, as exemplified by the anti-census politics of the Canadian right wing, should never be underestimated.

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Author's response

Dark Territory in the Information Age explores the West German census boycott movements of the 1980s as an early crucible for some evolving – inherently spatial – strategies of critical citizenship that broaden the scope of political 'representation' and activism into the realm of statistics and databases. Because the details of the controversies of 1983 and 1987 are so fascinating, I ended up sacrificing any explicit theoretical framework, and all but a compressed historical contextualization, in favor of a fuller empirical narrative (though see Hannah, 2009). Thus it is only fitting that many of the points raised in the thoughtful and thought-provoking readings by Patricia Ehrkamp, Jeremy Crampton, Bernd Belina and Neil Smith highlight the need to flesh out the relations between the informational politics practiced in the boycotts, issues in critical

social theory, more broadly conceived historical and present-day contexts, and possible political futures. Rather than address each reader's points in sequence, it seems more promising to take a thematic approach that widens the historical and theoretical fields in which to place the book's argument.

The passing of censuses?

Modern population censuses are a little over two hundred years old, and their days may already be numbered. The 2011 German *Zensus* mentioned by Patricia Ehrkamp lends weight to the suspicion that traditional head-count censuses are now on their way out in the Global North, obviated most immediately by a combination of ever more-refined statistical sampling techniques and a fast-growing plethora of databases. During this brief heyday, censuses have served as perhaps the pre-eminent exercise of what I call in the book "epistemic sovereignty", the right claimed by national or local states to obtain knowledge of people, things and activities going on within their territorial boundaries. Throughout the period of what we might call 'high statistical modernism' in the Global North, national states have had to rely heavily in official surveys upon the self-reporting of the resident population. One of the core arguments of *Dark Territories* is that especially this reliance upon self-reporting can be re-imagined as an opening for a representational politics in which 'being counted' is no longer merely a passive experience, and in which resistance to data gathering can become something more than the defensive protection of 'privacy'. The West German boycotts, following on the heels of the Dutch boycotts of ten years earlier (as Neil Smith notes), dramatized this possibility. Although ever more data are now gathered by non-state organizations such as corporations, the political opening afforded by the technical and procedural necessities of information gathering projects mean that the conditions for a new representational politics remain in place.

I emphasize throughout *Dark Territories* that the kind of "informational citizenship" which emerges in the West German boycott movements is not mostly or even chiefly about protecting or refusing to surrender information. This can be seen even more clearly by looking at censuses in the Global South, where statistical visibility to states is still often a privilege. Mere visibility, however, is not by itself an advantage to the enumerated. Informational citizenship in the fullest sense involves having some say not just in *whether* but in *how* one is counted or registered, which categories are used, and so on. The most significant aspect of the 1987 West German census boycott movement was not that it refused the state's enumeration but that it also arranged an alternative count on the basis of true anonymity. As Jeremy Crampton notes in his fabulously detailed commentary, there are many instances by now of a more politically aware approach to categories of official information. Since state data gathering exercises are more transparent and offer more avenues for citizen participation than their private counterparts (e.g. proprietary corporate marketing surveys), they are in general more susceptible to the kind of informational citizenship modeled by the West German boycotters in the 1980s.

Biopower

The initial overarching context in which to set the project of the book, then, is that of the ongoing politicization of forms of social knowledge. A broad awareness has developed since the 1960s that narrative, broadly 'cultural' forms of knowledge (literature, history, film and other popular culture, news media, etc.) construct and thereby constrain our understanding of social categories and political possibilities. *Dark Territories* seeks to highlight similar

issues in the area of statistical knowledge. But it is arguable that deeper political changes are eroding the basic rationale for censuses and other official social statistics. Here we need to move beyond the presuppositions of the book and ask how much scope there is *in practice* for the expansion *in principle* of political engagement into the realm of social statistics. According to the high modern justification for censuses, they provide the data the state requires in order to facilitate and support the independent processes of socio-economic life by allowing the efficient and appropriate provision of public goods. Censuses are arguably the paradigmatic form of social knowledge characterizing high modern biopower. To the extent that they serve such beneficent ends, as Crampton forcefully argues, censuses are something to be welcomed, not spurned, under normal circumstances. Mika Ojakangas (2005) suggests that the real danger facing social politics in the 21st century is the erosion of high modern biopower in favor of a social politics of ruthless abandonment. Recent scholarship has emphasized various more authoritarian, coercive or murderous strains of historical or present-day biopower, of which the neoliberal security state is only the latest variant (Agamben, 1998, 2005; Legg, 2007). In this vein, West German boycott publicity drew attention in the 1980s to Nazi use of censuses for mass murder to serve biopolitical ends. With this in mind, it is probably not accurate to speak of an erosion or disappearance of biopower, but rather of a sort of 'dessication', a shift in its emphases from 'softer', fuller support of human life to 'harder' orders of practice tuned to the fortification of 'security' against extreme or exceptional events and threats to property.

In the contexts where such a shift is happening, it is possible to discern a corresponding shift in informational politics. On the one hand, clearly, information that feeds surveillance and repression is being gathered in ever more (and ever more ingenious) ways. But a corresponding trend has been less widely noted, namely the weakening or dismantling of statistical infrastructures that have previously provided some quasi-objective registration of injustice, disadvantage, or unsolved social problems. This counter-trend reconfiguring state claims to epistemic sovereignty can be discerned, for instance, in the conservative campaign against the long form of the Canadian census noted by Neil Smith, or in the successful efforts of US conservatives to prohibit the use of statistical adjustments to rectify under-representation of poor (and thus largely Democratic) populations in the reapportionment of congressional districts based upon the 2000 US Census (Hannah, 2001). All of this suggests that the incipient move away from census-taking and other official statistics tracking the condition of human populations is spurred not merely by technical advances and the explosion of alternative data sources but more fundamentally by changes in the tectonics of modern power relations.

Biopower, capitalism, patriarchy

Why approach all of this through the category of biopower, rather than, say, class struggle under post-Fordist capitalism? This issue lurks behind the probing questions from Neil Smith regarding the absence of the category of class from *Dark Territories*. There is no easy answer to those questions. But, as Bernd Belina rightly recognizes despite my reticence on the topic, one of my overarching interests is in furthering dialog between broadly 'Foucauldian' and broadly 'Marxian' perspectives. Belina's characterization of the book as one that "explores the details of a social movement in order to challenge *the way in which we are governed in capitalist society*" (my emphasis) suggests in its choice of phrasing precisely the sort of *rapprochement* I am seeking. Here I would like to push more explicitly in this direction by proposing that we conceive of recent changes in liberal

capitalist social policy in terms of a shift from a form of biopower primarily devoted to supporting *human populations* to one dedicated chiefly to the welfare of the *population of capitals* (whether as discrete corporate capitals or as tradable and re-combinable packets of financial wealth) (see Hannah, 2011 for further speculations in this direction). The historical development of the disastrous legal doctrine of corporate personhood, ongoing forms of corporate welfare, and the financialization of global capitalism have all rendered it ever more plausible to speak of a population of capitals mimicking life and appearing to require biopolitical care. Through a strange sort of historical role-reversal, the governance practices of neoliberalism construct human individuals as 'human capital' competing above an ever more threadbare safety net in an ever more ruthlessly constructed marketplace, while capitals receive ever more lavish support in their quest to *avoid* full competition, culminating in the prized designation 'too big to fail'. At the same time, though, the basic justification for modern governance at the heart of high modern biopower, a perceived responsibility for the welfare of human populations, has not entirely disappeared. As yet, human populations in most countries of the Global North remain at least nominally 'too big to fail'.

If we acknowledge the continued relevance of the notion of responsibility for the life of human populations, it is possible to characterize the above noted changes in the production of statistical knowledge about society as part of a wider epistemic shift. Roughly speaking, in so far as the population of capitals eclipses human populations as the *real* beneficiary served by biopolitical measures, protestations on the part of neoliberal state officials and apologists that their decisions also benefit human populations become ever more strongly *ideological*, in the traditional, not the Althusserian, sense of ideology as a *misrepresentation of reality serving the interests of capital*. By striving to dismantle not only the policies but also the statistical infrastructure of high modern biopower, neoliberal actors seek to protect what is increasingly the *ideology* of biopower from forms of knowledge that could reveal it as deceptive. The only statistics still trumpeted by the new capital-centric biopower are those highly reductive aggregate economic measures (such as GDP, the Dow Jones average, or numbers of – undifferentiated – 'jobs' created) that track gross capital accumulation but veil the alarming mal-distributional or environmentally destructive features of neoliberal capitalism. Jettisoning differentiated social data or discontinuing their collection, opting not to exercise epistemic sovereignty where doing so could endanger the dominant story, makes sense in the context of capital-centric biopower.

Many of the narrative elements intended to recommend unbridled capital accumulation as the best way to promote human welfare are essentially variants of the long familiar 'trickle down' myth. But there are other important strands of narrative as well. Here Patricia Ehrkamp's questions regarding gender come into play. Ehrkamp raises the issue of gender in two different registers. One of these, concerning gendered constructions of public and private spaces in the West German census boycotts, is discussed in Chapter 4 of the book. The other register relates directly to the role of cultural narratives in rationalities of governance. One important function of gender narratives, particularly narratives of masculinity, lies precisely in their ability to run interference for the increasingly obvious mendaciousness of any sort of trickle down story. At the core of these flanking narratives stands the paterfamilias, the protective father figure. Ehrkamp cites Iris Marion Young's analysis of the "logic of masculinist protection" to characterize the West German state's bitter insistence on obedience to census laws. But I would like to suggest that the logic of masculinist protection also works in ways that further the specifically economic

platform of neoliberal, capital-centric biopower. Specifically, the state as protective father figure is strongly associated with the positive valuation of 'tough love'. The by-now ubiquitous discourses of welfare reform, critiques of the 'nanny state', etc. are essentially gendered discourses, drawing on the taproot of specifically *masculinist* fear and abhorrence of the specter of *dependency*. These discourses construct not only the state and state leaders, but also human populations as aspirationally masculine. The contrasting 'feminine' positions of the too-indulgent care-giver and the insufficiently self-reliant care-acceptor are both devalued.

As many feminist scholars and scholars in critical disability studies have made plain, the idealization of a life lived entirely free of dependency on others is damagingly delusional. All human beings spend a significant portion of our lives fully dependent upon others, and even as 'self-reliant adults' we in fact continuously rely upon our myriad connections with other people. Nevertheless, a broad denial of this fact is clearly hegemonic at the moment, and its historical ascendancy tracks that of neoliberal governmentality quite closely. The core point here is that the masculinist ideology of tough love offers a major advantage in the context of the current justificatory difficulties faced by neoliberal capitalism: it asserts a *compatibility between an attitude of 'care' and a practice of neglect, abandonment, or repression*. If the real operations of the new biopower focus ever more obviously on the exclusive support of capital, but the legacy of traditional biopower obligates leaders to claim that this form of governance still benefits human beings, it is difficult to imagine an ideological narrative more convenient than one which *reinterprets neglect as the most important form of care*.

If Mika Ojakangas (2005) is right that an ethic of care lies at the heart of biopower, his fears of an impending disappearance of caring biopower are misdirected. Instead, what we now face is perhaps better described as a new, bifurcated configuration of biopolitical care: one the one hand, care as *direct material support* flows increasingly to the population of capitals; on the other hand, care as *tough love*, or purportedly *benign neglect*, is all that is offered any longer to human populations. To paper over this gap ideologically, to convince the human public that the palpable neglect they suffer is in fact benign, a gendered narrative does increasingly prominent service. I would go further and suggest that the logic of protective masculinity in times of crisis diagnosed by Young, supplemented with the more mundane logic of masculinist 'tough love' discussed here, together describe a *core source of ideological coherence* holding together the strange constellation of neoliberalism and hypersecurity regimes that has been so prominent in global governmentality for the last decade.

Concluding comments

The goal of this response to readers has been to fill out a picture of the context in which to place the West German census boycotts of the 1980s. It has not been possible to address all of the thoughtful comments made by the four readers. Instead I chose a line of thinking that at least 'visits' many of their core areas of concern. I argued, first, that the ongoing democratization of forms of social knowledge should be extended into the realm of statistics, and that the West German boycotts are rich with ideas and practices through which this overall project can be pushed forward. The key lesson to be learned from the boycotts, however, is not one of simple refusal to be counted, but rather that being counted, precisely because it is often beneficial, should become a more participatory process. Yet, even while ever more people are beginning to become actively involved in a critical politics of counting and registration, it may be that traditional head-count censuses

are on the way out, at least in the Global North, due to advances in sampling techniques and the explosion of electronic databases. At a deeper level, censuses and other social surveys are arguably growing obsolete as the context of traditional, human-centric biopower within which they have blossomed comes under threat. On the one hand, as Agamben and others have argued, 'softer' biopolitical measures are increasingly being supplanted by 'harder', more repressive techniques of governance. More fundamentally, I suggest, the very ends and objects of biopower are shifting away from human populations altogether, and toward the population of capitals. The fate of censuses is thus caught up in larger shifts in the informational infrastructure of modern rule. While data infrastructures treating human beings as 'security risks' grow exponentially, databases constructing us as living beings with social needs are left to wither on the vine, or worse, are actively discontinued or dismantled.

The incipient trend toward the dismantling of socially-oriented data infrastructures serves an important function, namely that of protecting an ideological framework within which the new, capital-centric form of biopower can justify itself. If detailed social statistics may at times have appeared to support the claims of Fordist capitalism to benefit wider swathes of the human population, they are far less likely to support assertions regarding the social benefits of neoliberal capitalism. Yet, inconveniently for neoliberal capitalism, both a perceived responsibility toward the human population characteristic of older notions of biopower, and some of the informational infrastructure that formerly helped states attempt to discharge this responsibility, persist. The ideological framework for the new capitalist dispensation thus still has some of the same work to do, but must do it on the basis of more exclusively narrative knowledge. An increasingly important narrative put to work to support the new regime operates according to the gendered logic of masculine protection, addressing social policy through the figure of the beneficent father exercising tough love. Human populations are urged (with mind-numbing repetitiveness) to accept the perverse idea that *neglect is in fact support*.

To urge a democratization of processes of statistical knowledge production, as my book does, is to assume the continued centrality of state-gathered social statistics to modern governmental power. As I have suggested in this response, however, the changes we are now witnessing in the nature and ends of biopower undercut this assumption. Thus, while the project of *Dark Territories* may be fine as far as it goes, a politics adequate to its wider context would have to involve at least three additional elements: (1) activism in defense of the maintenance of specifically state-based statistical infrastructures capable of registering injustice and other social problems; (2) focused attempts to expose the masculinist distortions inherent in neoliberal ideologies of neglect-as-care; and (3) continued commitment to dismantling capital-centric biopower in favor of political economies that support real (human and non-human) life.

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